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The dichotomy of a systems approach in UK healthcare – the challenges 
and priorities for implementation. 
Abstract 
Word count 150 
There is increasing demand for a systems approach within national healthcare 
guidelines to provide a systematic and sustainable framework for improvements 
in patient safety. Supported by this is the growing body of evidence within 
Human Factors/Ergonomics (HFE) healthcare literature for the inclusion of this 
approach in health service design, provision and evaluation. This paper 
considers the current interpretation of this within UK healthcare systems and the 
dichotomy which exists in the challenge to implement a systems approach. 
Three case studies, from primary and secondary care, present a systems 
approach, offering a novel perspective of primary care and blood sampling. 
These provide practical illustrations of how HFE methods have been used in 
collaboration with healthcare staff to understand the system for the purpose of 
professional education, design and safety of clinical activities. The paper 
concludes with the challenge for implementation and proposes five roles for 
systems HFE to support patient safety. 
Practitioner Summary 
Healthcare is classified as a complex and dynamic system within this paper and 
as such HFE systems methods are presented as desirable to understand the 
system, to develop HFE tools, to deliver education and integrate HFE within 
healthcare systems. 
Keywords: systems, patient safety, human factors, ergonomics, healthcare 
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Introduction 
A ‘systems approach’ is considered an essential feature for the integration of Human 
Factors/Ergonomics (HFE) principles within an organisation and to inform education and 
training (Dul et al. 2012). The term ‘systems approach’ refers to understanding the context of 
the human within a specific environment. This is now a well-established recommendation for 
the NHS within the UK to apply specifically to inform the investigation of serious adverse 
events and the management of patient safety (NHS England 2015a, NHS England 2015b 
Health Education England 2016, House of Commons 2015). However, the dichotomy 
remains in the challenge to implement such an approach;  as the term ‘systems approach’ is 
recognised as having been misunderstood within the healthcare domain (Dekker and Leveson 
2014).  Outside of the HFE expert community, Healthcare HFE is currently not widely 
associated with an appreciation of how the design or components of a system influence the 
behaviour of frontline practitioners and patient experience/outcome (Waterson and Catchpole 
2015). Dul et al. (2012) clearly explains the fundamental characteristics of systems HFE 
which adopts a hierarchical approach to system improvement; prioritising fitting the 
environment and tasks to the human and only if this isn’t possible to select or train people to 
fit the environment.   
This paper does not intend to debate the merits of a systems approach but rather consider the 
challenge for such recommendations, and the interpretation of a systems approach within 
healthcare service provision.  Several points will be considered to explore why the challenge 
exists and three cases studies are offered to provide practical examples to support the 
interpretation of a systems approach in the context of healthcare.  
Finally, the authors will consider the challenges that exist for frontline staff to engage in a 
systems approach and propose five key areas that could be targeted to facilitate the 
implementation and embed the principles of a systems approach into healthcare. 
Interpretation of a systems approach 
Wilson (2014) documents the misuse of the term ‘systems approach’, but also acknowledged 
the need of the HFE profession to assist in clarifying its meaning. This elucidation should 
provide a tangible and relevant vision of what constitutes systems HFE for the industries we 
work with. 
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The aim of a systems approach is to improve the design of a particular system to enhance the 
performance, safety and wellbeing of the people that interact with it. A system can be 
considered as  
 ‘… a set of inter-related or coupled activities or entities (hardware, software, 
buildings, spaces, communities and people), with a joint purpose, links between the 
entities which may be of state, form, function and causation, and which changes and 
modifies its state and the interactions within it given circumstances and events, and 
which is conceptualised as existing within a boundary; it has inputs and outputs 
which may connect in many-to-many mappings; and with a bow to the Gestalt, the 
whole is usually greater (more useful, powerful, functional etc.) than the sum of the 
parts.’ Wilson (2014 p6) 
The first point to consider is how best to understand healthcare systems which imply 
considerable degrees of complexity (Hignett et al 2017). Vicente (1999) defines a complex 
system by certain characteristics of which healthcare exhibits. Specifically, these relate to the 
uncertainty in patient conditions, human behaviour and resources, the safety critical nature of 
the work which is prone to disturbances and commonly completed by multidisciplinary teams 
of people distributed within and between organisations. Typically the systems that frontline 
staff work within are a combination of several systems loosely linked which have evolved 
organically to meet a clinical demand (Wears and Hunte 2014). Examples include, the 
triangulation of care, patient transit and clinical interfacing between secondary, primary care 
and social services or care homes. These may differ between local areas but all share the 
same aims - to prioritise and attend to patients in response to their needs within the 
constraints of available resources. As such the complexity of many healthcare safety issues 
do not lend themselves to be investigated by reductionist methods but require a systems 
approach to investigate and support intervention design and implementation strategies 
(Dixon-Woods et al 2014) . To consider elements of the system in isolation, without 
considering the context and interactions, means there is a danger of poor decision making, 
poor design or recommendations for change. The use of structured systems methodologies 
can clarify the influential factors relevant to any design or organisational change and 
anticipate likely success, how it will behave once introduced and the wider ramifications 
within the system. However, Dixon-Woods et al (2014) acknowledges the challenge this can 
pose to organisations when a systems approach suggests the need for ‘radical redesign and 
7 
 
high level authority and resources’. This may in itself be inhibiting and without clear 
evidence linking the approach to safety improvement and cost effectiveness engagement with 
such holistic concepts may be hard to stimulate.  
Secondly, how healthcare describes ‘safety’ governs the design of artefacts and processes 
presented to staff for the management of safety within an organisation.  
Currently healthcare organisations and their regulators view systems as bimodal which either 
fail or succeed; where evidence of no harm implies safety (Hollnagel et al 2015a). This fails 
to consider emergence of success and failure as the norm and due to natural variability in 
behaviour of the system, and those within it, in response to specific contexts or competing 
goals (Hollnagel et al 2015b).   
This can perpetuate the view held by staff on the focus of safety, investigations or 
interventions and how to design or query the systems they work within.  This view of safety 
implies when everything works as it should nothing will go wrong; usually inferring if staff 
follow procedures the system will be safe. Presently the role and resources for safety 
governance in healthcare is mainly retrospective. This only considers when things don’t 
work, rather than how things usually work and safety is achieved, in the face of multiple 
conflicting goals and existing hazards. Current approaches to incident reporting and analysis 
adopts a reductionist view of healthcare systems. This seeks to ‘find and fix’ components of 
the system that have caused harm and is completed without expertise in systems thinking or 
Human Factors (Peerally et al 2016).  Furthermore, this ‘find and fix’ perspective falls short 
of then considering the wider implications within the system when a ‘cause’ is identified and 
addressed in isolation, in the absence of a systems approach to the development of solutions.  
 
Thirdly the knowledge and understanding of a systems approach is limited in healthcare staff 
despite acknowledgements of the benefits (AHRQ 2013, Alvarado et al 2004, Carayon 2010, 
Norris 2011, Catchpole 2013, Gurses et al 2012, Hignett et al 2015).  HFE is a scientific 
discipline which requires accredited HFE training, as demonstrated by the award of the royal 
charter in December 2014. However, this is not a criteria for NHS practitioners who deliver 
HFE education or interventions and may not represent a systems approach within their 
training.  Exception to this has been the commissioning of an accredited HFE introduction 
course by Health Education England (Hignett et al 2017), whose remit was to improve HFE 
understanding of healthcare professionals and providers, the quality of which was guaranteed 
by the fact that the training course was delivered by qualified members of the national 
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accredited body, Chartered Institute for Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF).  Key 
safety roles within the NHS e.g.  Patient safety leads, governance roles do not insist on 
specific qualifications or education in safety or risk management either (NHS Health 
Education England 2016). There is also considerable variability in these roles receiving HFE 
education; with HFE expertise generally accessed on an ad hoc basis. Therefore what a 
systems approach looks like to healthcare providers can remain elusive; yet at the same time 
a desirable quality and field of expertise for frontline staff to apply to safety related 
healthcare activities. There appears to be a gap between the national goals for a systems 
approach in HFE to be applied; as indicated in several recent national guidance documents, 
and the practical capability available within NHS organisations (NHS England 2015a, NHS 
England 2015b Health Education England 2016). This is despite many efforts over time to 
promote the application of HFE generally within medical work settings and for patient safety 
(Straker 1989; Leape 1994; Kohn et al 1999; Hignett 2001; Flin et al 2009) and specifically 
encouraging a systems design approach within healthcare more widely (Leape et al 1995; 
Taylor Adams, Vincent & Street 2004; Leape & Berwick 2005; Carayon et al 2006; Carayon 
& Wood 2010 NHS England 2013). 
The challenge for HFE and a systems approach  
Any HFE contribution must reflect the context where it is intended. So here we will consider 
the complexities and factors which make the need for HFE interventions and research so 
essential in healthcare and also present the challenges for this work. 
A dynamic system 
Healthcare services need to be dynamic systems which have to respond to and predict 
demands associated to the communities they serve. This service provision has to operate 
alongside the added uncertainty in how a change in Government may direct or fund 
healthcare systems. This creates the potential for changes in financial priorities and 
organisational structures every four years. Additionally, procurement processes within the 
NHS can have a huge effect. These can potentially constrain how frontline staff are required 
to accommodate systems thinking in the context of their work activities and the resulting 
HFE issues, some of which are outlined below. Currently, healthcare systems are not 
designed to ‘fit the human in the system’ but expect that the human element should adapt and 
balance  organisational goals, procedures, systems, environments and equipment in the 
context of their everyday work. This dynamism and complexity is further compounded by the 
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movement of the workforce within the organisational structure and between different 
healthcare systems, either geographically or temporally. Standardisation between the systems 
is not always evident and as such this creates additional intricacy for the workforce in regards 
to learning and practice.   
 
Healthcare staff are expected to provide clinical practice and continuity of care in an ever-
changing landscape of their organisations. The complexity of the services and equipment 
with increasing utilisation of technology to support the delivery of patient care has meant a 
significant shift in healthcare work practices, working environments and modes of interaction 
within the system. Nonetheless, the goals remain the same – to avoid harm for any patient 
receiving healthcare interventions and to use available evidence to inform how this is 
achieved in the most efficient way. 
 
Technical systems 
The NHS is cited globally as a good model for healthcare (NHS Confederation 2016), there is 
a need to preserve the best of this institution in the context of limited resources, competing 
priorities and a growing and ageing population.  
Cultural change may be necessary to accommodate the shift in modern systems. For example, 
a steady increase in the implementation and utilisation of technological solutions within the 
healthcare service needs to be reflected on to understand how different clinical roles benefit 
and consider any unexpected consequences. The change in practitioner work demands 
associated with many technical systems are yet to be fully evaluated in relation to workload 
(Magrabi et al 2015). Efforts to address this gap are growing (Cresswell & Shiekh 2013) and 
will gradually contribute to a better understanding of the cultural shift in clinical practice and 
how existing technology influences safe and efficient health care.  
 
The design of new healthcare technical systems often appears to be based on existing paper 
systems, the effectiveness and reliability of which may be unproven and relies upon how 
practitioners adapt these to specific clinical contexts. Technical solutions have the potential to 
be beneficial to the speed of information transfer and standardising the format of information, 
between interacting systems, organisations or teams – particularly in healthcare systems 
where distributed working practices are commonplace. They can promote transparency and 
affordance of a system to support a common understanding of patient information.  However, 
success of a system relies upon the reliability, design and availability of technology. These 
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factors determine the sequence of a practitioner’s clinical actions and the reliability of 
selecting the right information. HFE system methods can provide a comprehensive structure 
to capture data on requirements of all stakeholders to ensure existing systems achieve their 
function. Adjustments by frontline staff in their work practices may be the norm to ensure 
safety and efficiency goals are balanced. Subsequently, adjustments in work practices may 
not reflect procedures or how managers and system designers perceive an existing system to 
operate. This creates a mismatch between how work is imagined and work is done (Hollnagel 
et al 2015a) 
Costs of complexity 
Healthcare requires tools which can capture and visualise the complexity of its systems to 
understand contributory factors, accountability and responsibilities for safety management. 
For example to process a single patient test sample may involve several different 
organisations and multiple software systems. Consequently the interactions between 
systems and the reliability of such systems are critical to safe and efficient diagnosis and 
management of a patient’s health. Incompatibility, poor system design or uncontrolled 
changes within a poorly understood system have implications for patient safety and cost to 
the NHS. The estimation that harm occurs to 10% of all inpatients is commonly cited (Kohn 
et al. 2000) In 2014/15 the total expenditure due to litigation costs against the NHS was 
£1,169,586,958 (NHS Confederation 2016, NHS Litigation Authority 2014/15).  Neither of 
these figures can be considered desirable for the wellbeing of patients and staff or for the 
sustainability of the NHS.  
 
Case Studies 
The three case studies described within this paper have been completed by the authors over 
several years, with the aim to demonstrate the breadth in application of a systems approach.  
The case studies represent close collaborations between healthcare and HFE professionals, 
providing recognition that this work has mainly been field based whilst retaining the 
principles of well established HFE methodologies. Such collaboration in the future is critical 
to develop the body of evidence for the evaluation of HFE involvement in the context of 
complex healthcare systems. However, to achieve this level of engagement and rigor in the 
HFE systems approaches adopted, consideration of the challenges within such a context is 
required. 
HFE is described in Dul et al’s 2012 statement paper as focusing on different aspects of the 
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person and environment in the context of a goal orientated and purposefully designed system.  
The focus of the case studies illustrate three different contexts where a systems approach has 
not previously been applied (Singh et al 2014, Cottrell et al 2013). Case 1 considers 
integration of HFE into General Practitioners trainee education to enhance understanding of 
the ‘systems approach’ by frontline staff.  Case 2 considers the system interactions and 
design of primary care healthcare settings, representing how healthcare systems can be 
understood and their influence on safety.  Finally, case 3 investigates a safety relevant work 
process to understand how a systems approach can explain variability in the safety and 
performance of blood sampling. 
The table below provide a high level overview of each case and a narrative description of 
methods which promote how a systems approach contributed to the output of each study. The 
following sections provide descriptive accounts of the outcomes and learning points for the 
healthcare service/ industry. 
 
Table 1 Summary of case studies 
Case 1: Primary Care HFE Education 
Summary of case A review of existing GP training programmes to understand how 
systems HFE was relevant to the trainee GPs in their clinical and 
organisational work activities.   
Methods applied Review of professional and organisational documents from the 
General Medical Council (GMC) and the Royal College of GPs 
(RCGP); Interviews and informal discussions with GP Trainers, GP 
trainees, GP Practice Managers, Practice Nurses and Administrative 
staff; A Work Domain Analysis (WDA) and development of an 
Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) 
Application of systems 
approach 
The study sought to understand the main goals, work activities and 
systems required by the trainee GP whilst training within a GP 
Practice.  The GP setting should be viewed as a complex 
sociotechnical system from a care service and specialty training 
perspective with any future HFE-related education and training 
designed to reflect their role and the structure of the wider system 
within which they function and interact.  HFE education for GP 
trainees (and the wider GP team) should provide sufficient breadth to 
highlight concepts and approaches that reflect the whole 
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sociotechnical system and its goals of delivering high quality, safe 
and efficient patient care, whilst protecting the wellbeing of the 
workforce required to achieve this. Embracing this approach can 
ensure a comprehensive understanding of how the context and the 
design of the working environment and technologies are key to 
influencing human behaviour and performance in the workplace 
Case 2: Design for Primary Care Settings 
Summary of case Develop a better understanding of the relationship between the 
design of GP surgeries and community hospitals and patient safety 
incidents through a multi method approach 
Methods applied Review of significant event audits (SEAs), analysis of a sample of 
Patient Safety Incident (PSI) records from the NRLS (National 
Reporting and Learning System), subject matter expert workshop 
(Architect, practice manager, Design specialists),  focus groups with 
those in GP/community hospital roles, a stakeholder and patients 
group, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of specific 
aspects of activities in GP surgeries and community hospitals 
Application of systems 
approach 
Many of the incidents and reports were attributed to the fact that the 
services of the GP practice or community hospital, or even of the wider 
healthcare system are often understood as different and separate 
systems, rather than interconnected sub systems of a greater whole. It 
was considered that understanding of the user interactions within the 
wider system and subsequently within the GP surgery as a sub-system 
would allow for design to consider all elements of the system, and 
consequently reduce the risks of errors/ incidents.  
 
Case 3: Blood Sampling in Secondary Care 
Summary of case To understand why variability in blood sampling occurs 
Methods applied Observation, interviews, review of incident data in one year), 
application of the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient 
Safety (SEIPs) model, Functional resonance Analysis Method 
(FRAM) 
Application of systems 
approach 
The study looked at the whole system of blood sampling from request 
through to sample collection, identifying the functions required as well 
as the constraints associated with the equipment, patient identification, 
13 
 
environment. Adopting a Human Factors approach and using the 
FRAM model enabled better understanding of how the work is really 
done within the system and why variability exists in a complex 
healthcare environment. 
 
Case 1 Primary Care HFE Education 
This first case study considers the primary care system specifically in the context of a 
General Practitioner (GP) trainee, for a full description of the findings see Mckay et al 2016.  
NHS Scotland requested a review of their existing GP training programmes to understand 
how systems HFE could be relevant to the trainee GPs in their clinical and organisational 
work activities.  There are currently twenty goals to be achieved during GP training which 
relate to clinical practice but also administration of a safe and financially sustainable GP 
practice (GMC 2013, Royal College of General Practitioners Curriculum 2010). This 
exploratory study reviewed professional and organisational documents from the General 
Medical Council (GMC) and the Royal College of GPs (RCGP). These provided the 
requirements, competences and good practice guidance for the trainee GP. Interviews and 
informal discussions were completed with GP Trainers (n=2, 75 mins), GP trainees (n=3, 120 
mins), GP Practice Managers (n=2, 110 mins), Practice Nurses (n=2, 70 mins) and 
Administrative staff (n=3, 90 mins) to understand the main goals, work activities and systems 
required by the trainee GP whilst training within a GP Practice. The first stage in this work 
was to interpret the data gathered to define the system within which the trainee GP works and 
to understand the associated context and constraints. A Work Domain Analysis (WDA) 
specifies the purpose, values, priorities and functions of a systems (Rasmussen 1985). This 
approach was considered beneficial to provide a generalised representation of the GP trainee 
work domain; where constraints, unanticipated events and uncertainty are typical and rely on 
the flexibility of the staff to accommodate and maximise safety.  
A WDA is the first of five phases in a Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA). Future work would 
be beneficial to verify the WDA and enhance the understanding of the GP system further 
through completion of a CWA.  This would provide a generic representation of GP work 
activities, strategies, organisational requirements and worker competencies required to 
deliver a Primary care service; there appears no evidence of such an analysis within the 
primary care literature. This project provided a novel representation of the GP system in the 
14 
 
form of an Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) which describes the system at five levels of 
granularity. The rule of thumb to complete an AH, is that each level of description can be 
related to the one above and below to explain ‘why’ the system is required, ‘what’ the system 
does and ‘how’ this is achieved, see Figure 1 (Vicente 1999, Miller and Vicente 2001).  
 
Figure 1 A sample of the Abstraction Hierarchy completed for an accredited GP training 
surgery 
 
Through the interviews completed an iterative approach to developing the AH was adopted. 
This enabled clarification of previous interviews to inform the AH overall findings and a 
representation of the GP system to inform developments in GP training. In summary the GP 
trainee is expected to interact with 18 different job roles, at least 7 different technical systems 
and see one patient every 20 minutes (preparing themselves for every 10 minutes once 
qualified). The study highlighted the core functions of the trainee GP are predominantly 
associated with patient consultations, the interpretation of these communications and 
information from a number of sources e.g. physical examinations and investigations, to 
inform clinical decision making and  management of the patient’s condition and social 
support. These functions are constrained by time, compatibility of systems, flow of 
information and the support provided within the Practice and other organisations interacted 
with e.g. Pharmacy, Laboratories, Social Services, Secondary Care. This study highlighted 
the need to understand further how system interactions, information exchange and decision 
making is influenced by the GP’s work contexts e.g. consulting rooms, remote consultations, 
patient’s home. The output of this study provided recommendations on the core areas of HFE, 
figure 2. The WDA and AH provides a map of the landscape and system within which GP 
trainees will practice. The interactions and constraints recognised through this project have 
been suggested to direct the focus of any HFE education programme for GP trainees. The 
recommendations from this project (McKay et al 2016) will contribute to the integration of 
HFE education in the context of existing GP training. This will aim to support GP trainees 
develop skills to understand issues at different levels of the system and improve their working 
environment to optimise performance, safety and wellbeing.  
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Insert Figure 2 HFE areas relevant to GP training 
 
Design for Primary Care Settings 
In a healthcare environment humans interact with the facility and its equipment and 
technology and therefore its design can have an effect on human performance (Reiling and 
Chernos, 2007). Research suggests that there is a link between the environment of hospitals 
and patient health and wellbeing and there is some evidence that the built environment can 
influence the healing process and have a direct impact on patient outcomes (including levels 
of anxiety and stress) (Douglas and Douglas, 2004). Harris et al. (2002) distinguish three 
relevant dimensions of the physical environment, architectural features, interior design 
features and ambient features.  These may influence patient safety via their influence on (for 
example): ease of communication between patients and medical personnel; patient behaviour 
(e.g. whether a patient or patient’s companion feels confident to point out an error that they 
have spotted may have occurred within the medical environment);  ease and accessibility of 
presentation of patient information; perceived patient privacy and confidentiality (e.g. 
whether patient feels that they are being overheard when communicating private information) 
and general level of comfort and well-being of the patient whilst in the care environment. In 
addition, there is a need to consider the effect of building design on the systems operating 
within and between healthcare environments as these can have a direct effect on patient 
safety (e.g. where the design of areas designated for medication preparation may affect the 
likelihood of errors being made for example by having inadequate lighting levels). This study 
aimed to develop a better understanding of the relationship between the design of GP 
surgeries and community hospitals and patient safety incidents. A multi method approach 
involved focus groups with those in GP/community hospital roles, a stakeholder group and 
patients, analysis of NRLS data, review of Significant Event Audits (SEAs), a workshop with 
subject matter experts (SMEs) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of specific 
aspects of activities in GP surgeries and community hospitals. This work identified a conflict 
between the needs of different user groups, for example with access to buildings where 
automatic doors were recognised as a hazard for small children but without automatic doors 
staff may be required to assist patients who cannot easily access though, often heavy doors.  
 
Many of the incidents and reports can be attributed to the system of the GP practice or 
community hospital, or even of the wider healthcare system, for example, a long queue at a 
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reception desk in a GP surgery may result in a potential patient not being able to wait to make 
an appointment therefore not seeing a clinician and not, therefore, receiving a timely 
diagnosis. This could potentially also increase the pressure on receptionists (who may already 
be under-staffed) who are then, possibly, more likely to make an error when booking in a 
patient.  An example was found in the NRLS data where the wrong patient was sent to the 
consultation room and the consultation entered into the incorrect medical records and 
medication was issued on the same record.  Where there are examples of conflict within a 
system, using them to inform the design process could assist in promoting flexibility within a 
design or inform where further design features are required to counteract the problems and 
build resilience into the system. It is apparent that those involved in the design process work 
within constraints and parameters set by the NHS and the availability of knowledge.  
Consideration through a systems approach identified a lack of information available to 
architects with regards to how users interact in a building, the equipment they use and the 
practices they adopt, information which does exist is thought to be outdated and not in line 
with advancements in technology or equipment.  There is very little feedback provided to 
those involved in the design process regarding the success of their design and their 
knowledge of incidents or experiences of those working within the building is limited. 
 
Whilst this process highlighted elements of known and unknown interactions, the systems 
approach highlights the gaps in knowledge required for designing appropriately for users in 
the GP and community hospital environment.  By taking this approach steps are made to ease 
design for integration by addressing long term use and issues of congruency, integration, 
social process and shaping (Clegg 2000) reinforcing the system improvement approach of 
Dul et al. (2012). This appreciation for the human and social needs and their inextricable 
links to the systems requirements also facilitates dialogue and feedback culture which could 
lead to improved communication pathways within an organisation and externally to those 
who are ‘brought in’ from outside the health service to design their premises, technology 
systems and artefacts.   
 
 
Blood Sampling in Secondary Care 
This case study took a fresh look at a long standing issue of safety in blood sampling.  The 
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data suggests 50% of all near misses are related to Wrong Blood In Tube incidents (WBITs) 
with a 77% increase in WBIT rates between 2010 – 2014 (Bolton-Maggs et al. 2014). A 
blood sample is the first activity necessary to establish the compatibility of any future blood 
products administered to a patient (British Committee for Standards in Haematology 2012). 
Transfusions of incompatible blood products may cause death or serious morbidity. Despite 
national guidelines and local procedures concerns linked to the sampling of bloods are 
particularly related to patient identification and labelling of samples (Dzik et al. 2003, 
Gonzalez et al. 2008, Murphy and Kay 2004). 
This case study is of a pilot study completed with NHS Scotland to understand why 
variability exists in patient identification and labelling of blood samples (Pickup et al. 2016). 
The aim of this work was to understand ‘work as done’ rather than ‘perceived to be done’.  
This study adopted methods not previously applied to consider the context and healthcare 
systems relevant to blood sampling to identify factors contributing to the variability of work 
practices in the context: of clinical departments, working environments and organisational 
goals. This was a multi method study completed in four Scottish hospitals, involving 
observations (n=50), interviews (n=15, 480 mins) and a review of one year’s incident data. 
The findings were thematically analysed using the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient 
Safety (SEIPS) model (Carayon et al. 2006) and variability analysed using the Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method –FRAM (Hollnagel 2012). FRAM is a method specifically 
intended to analyse complex systems and creates a model of the interactions between the 
functions which represented the system for blood sampling and identify where variability in 
performance may have the greatest impact. Adjustments made by clinical staff to 
accommodate specific situations or working environments are considered using the FRAM 
model and identify where positive or negative variability may influence an output from one 
or several functions. Analysis using FRAM showed why procedures may not always be 
followed and explained why the output of a function may influence the safety and 
performance of a blood sampling activity. Figure 3 presents a summary of the core functions 
(inner circle) and background functions (outer circle) and the factors contributing to the 
variability observed. The findings suggested that use of technology was core to: the reliability 
of patient details, requests for a blood sample and labels being available prior to blood 
sampling. The accessibility, location and reliability of technology or its timely repair 
influenced how practitioners modified their work and checks to minimise delay in obtaining a 
sample and manage workload associated with a high volume of patients. The working 
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contexts influenced how blood sampling functions were organised to balance clinical and 
safety goals in the context of organisational targets.   
 
Figure 3 Blood sampling functions and contributory factors to how work was done  
Variability was discovered in the number of practitioners involved in a single blood sampling 
process, whilst equipment design and environmental factors. These three contributors 
influenced how practitioners varied work practices to mitigate the impact of time pressures, 
common distractions and delays. 
The systems approach ensured the context was accounted for as influential to why 
practitioners completed blood samples as observed and reported, not previously 
acknowledged in improvement initiatives. This study illustrates how variability in the 
practitioner’s work practices balanced the trade-off between efficiency and thoroughness in 
order to achieve the required level of performance. This work has informed the Scottish 
National Blood Transfusion Team’s quality Improvement agenda and has been shared with 
SHOT to inform and consider the existing design of the transfusion process (Bolton-Maggs et 
al. 2014). 
Case study summary 
These three case studies represent examples of methods, which adopt a systems approach. 
The application of which have proved beneficial in understanding the interconnecting 
mechanisms, procedures and organisation of the ‘complex whole’  of three healthcare work 
contexts within  primary and secondary care systems. The approach and methods employed 
have allowed healthcare practitioners to explore the system relative to its functions and goals, 
suggested as the necessary approach in the analysis of complex systems (Rasmussen 1985, 
Vicente 1999). These examples offer practical demonstrations of how a systems approach can 
increase the transparency of complex systems to inform professional education, understand 
the constraints on system functions and goals and how the design of the system can be better 
understood in relation to failure and performance variability. 
Implementing systems HFE into healthcare 
Carayon et al (2006) identified HFE as an innovation within healthcare, and whilst progress 
has been made (As described earlier in this paper) there is still much to achieve with regard to 
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the diffusion, dissemination , implementation and sustainable use of HFE in healthcare.  
The diffusion of HFE in UK healthcare can be seen through a steady rise in publications 
reflecting the application and benefit of HFE within different healthcare contexts (Bowie et al 
2015, Hignett et al 2011, Lang et al 2013, Morgan et al 2013). 
However, HFE in UK healthcare remains opportunistic, illustrated by the case studies 
presented within this paper. The dissemination of HFE, the active and planned efforts to 
integrate HFE is still in its infancy and less well evidenced compared to other industries 
(Waterson et al. 2015). However, recent action suggests a degree of momentum with HFE 
professionals supporting the UK healthcare industry.  These include a national 
recommendation for accredited healthcare tailored HFE education (Health Education England 
2016, Hignett et al 2016) and engagement with HFE expertise for the review of incidents 
(Department of Health 2015). The instigation of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Board 
(HSIB), who intend to employ HFE expertise, promises a positive example for the integration, 
of HFE and a systems approach to investigations.  
 
Successful implementation of any innovation relies upon many factors (Greenhalgh et al 
2004). System readiness and the support from top management is critical. Collaboration 
between managers, healthcare staff, operational managers, quality improvement teams and 
HFE professionals is essential to ensure healthcare can embrace the knowledge from each 
discipline to develop safer solutions for healthcare (Hignett et al. 2015). However, the 
interrelationship between professionals, otherwise known as the ‘soft systems’ within an 
organisation presents its own justifiable challenges (Hollnagel et al 2015, Kirwan 2000). Inter 
relationships between different professionals, time pressures, organisational priorities and 
management motivations all require an appreciation to understand how best to ensure the 
effectiveness of any improvement strategy (Pannick et al. 2015). As a profession HFE still 
needs to seek to understand how this can be best achieved within the existing NHS landscape 
and integrated to augment other improvement professionals. Human resources is another 
factor identified by Greenhalgh et al (2004) as relevant to successful implementation.   
There are multiple job roles employed within healthcare organisations, each providing a 
different aspect of safety and care to be co-ordinated for a single patient. This presents multiple 
challenges for considering interactions within and between teams, medical disciplines and 
different medical specialities, all with their own priorities and constraints. Patient safety is the 
responsibility of all but co-ordinated by few who seek to maintain a balance between 
identifying relevant risks and managing large sets of data to ensure they meet local system 
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constraints in addition to national and organisational regulations and targets. Those in safety 
roles may hold relatively temporary posts, 1 – 2 years, and when safety is locally improved, 
financial savings may be achieved by the loss of some safety roles. Regular changes in staff 
threaten continuity in providing high quality education to implement HFE and a systems 
approach within an organisation’s safety management strategy.   
Considering the sustainability of the implementation of HFE, in such a fluid context, the 
authors propose the need for the integration of a systems approach into the fabric of healthcare 
education and safety tools. In particular strengthening five key areas: 
 HFE education within professional education and organisational mandatory training; 
 Prospective hazard and risk analysis through engagement between HFE professionals 
and  frontline staff to build expertise and organisational capacity; 
 Work, system and procedure evaluation ; 
 Guidance to inform development, design and procurement of equipment; 
 Incident reporting and investigating systems representative of complex sociotechnical 
systems. 
The evidence and case studies highlight the application of methods which adopt a systems 
approach are desirable and achievable in understanding and contributing to the design of 
healthcare staff education, work environments and processes. However, knowledge relevant 
to complex systems and the engagement required suggest the dichotomy remains for the 
implementation of a systems approach in healthcare. The authors have drawn on their 
experiences to propose five areas which they believe, through design which adopts a HFE 
systems approach would allow a systems approach to become integrated within healthcare 
organisations. 
Conclusion 
This paper provides an overview of the current state of systems HFE integration in healthcare 
and offers three case studies to illustrate how a systems approach has been applied within 
healthcare contexts.  The studies consider contributions to HFE in healthcare education, work 
environment and equipment design and safety processes. To tackle the identified 
misconceptions about systems HFE in healthcare, this contribution proffers a ‘take away’ 
message of five key areas for where future work can find value in the application of HFE 
systems approaches. Championing a systems approach to be applied in healthcare is not 
novel, however, there appears a gulf in the interpretation and practical demonstration of what 
that means for practitioners and those with safety roles within the NHS. 
21 
 
References 
Alvarado,C,J., Cao,C., Klein,G., Weinger,M,B., Patterson,E., Cook,R,I and Carayon,P 
2004. Panel: The role of human factors in healthcare – 2020. Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting Proceedings, 48(15):1764-1767 · September 
2004. 
Bolton-Maggs, PHB, Poles D, Watt, A. and Thomas, D. on behalf of the Serious Hazards 
of Transfusion (SHOT) Steering Group. 2014. The 2013 Annual SHOT Report. 
Bowie, P., Forrest,E.,  Price,J.,  Verstappen,W., Cunningham,D.,  Halley,L.,  Grant,S.,  
Kelly,M.,  & Mckay,J  2015. “Good practice statements on safe laboratory testing: A 
mixed methods study by the LINNEAUS collaboration on patient safety in primary care”, 
European Journal of General Practice, 21: 19-25, DOI: 10.3109/13814788.2015.1043724 
British Committee for Standards in Haematology. Guideline on the Administration of 
Blood Components 
2012.http://www.bcshguidelines.com/documents/Admin_blood_components_bcsh_05012
010.pdf (accessed February 2nd, 2015). 
Carayon,P., Schoofs Hundt, A., Karsh B-T., Gurses, A.P., Alvarado, C.J., Smith, M. and  
Flatley Brennan, P. 2006. “Work System design for patient safety: the SEIPS model.”  
Quality and Safety in Healthcare 15(1):50-58. 
Carayon, P. and K. E. Wood (2010). "Patient Safety: The Role of Human Factors and 
Systems Engineering." Studies in health technology and informatics 153: 23-46. 
Catchpole, K. 2013. “Spreading Human Factors Expertise in Healthcare: Untangling the  
Knots in People and Systems.” BMJ Quality and Safety. doi: 10.1136/bmjqs-2013- 
002036. 
Clegg, C., W. 2000. "Sociotechnical principles for system design." Applied Ergonomics  
31(5): 463-477. 
Cottrell, S., Watson, D., Eyre, T.A., et al., 2013. Interventions to reduce wrong blood in tube 
errors in transfusion: a systematic review. Transfus. Med. Rev. 27, 197e205. 
Cresswell, K. and A. Sheikh (2013). "Organizational issues in the implementation and  
22 
 
adoption of health information technology innovations: An interpretative review." 
International Journal of Medical Informatics 82,5: 73-86. 
Douglas, C.H and Douglas, M., R. 2004. “Patient-friendly hospital environments: exploring 
the patients’ perspective.”  Health Expectations 7: 61-73. 
Dekker, S,W,A and Leveson,N,G. 2016. “The systems approach to medicine”. BMJ Quality  
and Safety, 24: 7-9. 
Dixon-Woods, M., Martin,G., Tarrant,C., Bion,J., Goeschel,C., Pronovost, P., Brewster, L., 
Shaw,L., Sutton,L., Willars,J., Ketley,D and Woodcock ,T 2014. “Learning from the 
independent evaluation of the second phase of the Safer Clinical Systems programme”.  
http://www.health.org.uk/publication/safer-clinical-systems-evaluation-findings accessed 
on 25th November 2016. 
Dul, J., Bruder, R., Buckle, P., Carayon, P., Falzon, P., Marras, W,S., Wilson, J. and Van der 
Doelen, B. 2012. “A Strategy for Human Factors/Ergonomics: Developing the Discipline 
and Profession.” Ergonomics, 55(4): 377-395. 
Dzik, W. H., Murphy, M. F., Andreu, G., Heddle, N., Hogman, C., Kekomaki, R.,  
Murphy, S., Shimizu, M., Smit-Sibinga, C. T. and the Biomedical Excellence for Safer  
Transfusion (BEST) Working Party of the International Society for Blood Transfusion. 
2003. “An international study of the performance of sample collection from patients.” Vox 
Sanguinis 85: 40–47.  
Flin, R., et al. (2009). "Human factors in patient safety: review of topics and tools." World 
Health 2.GMC (2013) Good Medical Practice 
http://www.gmcuk.org/static/documents/content/Good_medical_practice_-
_English_0414.pdf Accessed 5th Aug 2014 
Gonzalez-Porras, J. R., Graciani, I. F., Alvarez, M., Pinto, J., Conde, M. P., Nieto, M. J. and 
Corral, M. 2008. “Tubes for pretransfusion testing should be collected by blood bank staff 
and hand labelled until the implementation of new technology for improved sample 
labelling. Results of a prospective study.” Vox Sanguinis 95: 52–56. 
Greenhalgh,T., Robert,G., Macfarlane,F., Bate,P and Kyriakidou,) 2004. Diffusion of 
innovations in service organisations: systematic review and recommendations. The 
Millbank Quarterly 82 (4): 581-629. 
23 
 
Gurses AP, Ozok AA, Provonost PJ. Time to accelerate integration of human factors and 
ergonomics in patient safety. BMJ Quality and Safety 2012 21: 347–51. 
Harris, P, B., McBride, G., Ross, C. and Curtis, L. 2002. A Place to Heal: Environmental  
Sources of Satisfaction Among Hospital Patients. Journal of Applied Social Psychology  
32 (6): 1276-1299. 
Health Education England. 2016. Improving Safety through Education and Training. 
https://www.hee.nhs.uk/sites/default/files/documents/FULL%20report%20medium%20res%
20for%20web.pdf (accessed on 25th April 2016) 
Hignett, S.  2001. “Embedding ergonomics in hospital culture: top-down and bottom-up 
strategies.” Applied Ergonomics 32: 61-69. 
Hignett, S. Jones, A., and Benger, J. (2011) Portable treatment technologies 
for urgent care. Emergency Medicine Journal, 28 (3). pp.192-196. ISSN 1472-0205 
Available from: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/5525 
Hignett, S., Leanne-Jones,E., Miller,D., Wolf,L., Modi,C., Shahzad, M.W.,  Buckle, 
P.,Banerjee, J. and Catchpole, K. 2015. “Human Factors and Ergonomics and Quality 
Improvement Science: Integrating Approaches for Safety in Healthcare.” BMJ Quality and 
Safety doi: 10.1136/bmjqs-2014-003623 
Hignett,S., Lang,A.,  Pickup,L., Ives,C., Fray,M., McKeown,C., Tapley,S., Woodward,M & 
Bowie,P 2017. “More Holes than Cheese. What prevents the delivery of effective, high 
quality, and safe healthcare in England?” Ergonomics, in Press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2016.1245446 
Hollnagel, E. 2012. FRAM: the Functional Resonance Analysis Method. Surrey: Ashgate. 
Hollnagel,E., Braithwaite,J and Wears,R.L 2015a. Resilient Health Care. Ashgate, Surrey. 
Hollnagel,E., Wears,R.L and Braithwaite,J 2015b. From Safety-I to Safety-II: A White  
Paper. https://www.england.nhs.uk/signuptosafety/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/2015/10/safety-1-safety-2-whte-papr.pdf (accessed on 25th April 
2016) 
House of Commons’ Public Administration Select Committee (PASC). Investigating clinical 
incidents in the NHS. Sixth Report of Session 2014–2015. 2015. 
24 
 
Kirwan, B. 2000. “Soft Systems, Hard Lessons.” Applied Ergonomics 31: 663-678. 
Kohn, L.T., Corrigan, J.M., Donaldson, M.S., 2000. To Err Is Human – Building A Safer 
Health System. National Academy Press, Washington, DC. 
 Lang, A.R., Martin,J.L., Sharples, S and Crowe,J.A  2013. The effect of design on the 
usability and real world effectiveness of medical devices: A case study with adolescent 
users. Applied Ergonomics, 44: 799-810 
Leape, L.L. 1994.  Error in medicine.  The Journal of the American Medical Association, 
272, 1851-1857. 
Leape LL, Bates DW, Cullen DJ, Cooper J, Demonaco HJ, Gallivan T, et al. Systems 
analysis of adverse drug events 1995. Journal of the American Medical Association. 
1995;274 (1):35–43. [PubMed] 
Leape LL and Berwick DM. Five years after To Err Is Human: What have we learned? 2005. 
Journal of the American Medical Association. 2005;293(19):2384–2390. 
Magrabi F, Liaw ST, Arachi D, Runciman,W., Coiera,E and Kidd,MR 2015. Identifying 
patient safety problems associated with information technology in general practice: an 
analysis of incident reports, BMJ Quality and Safety 2015;01–11 doi: 10.1136/bmjqs-
2015-004323 
McKay, J., Pickup, L., Atkinson, S., McNab, D. and Bowie, P. 2016. Exploratory Human 
Factors Analysis of the General Practice Speciality Training and Work Environments. 
Education for Primary Care. doi:10.1080/14739879.2016.1181533 
Miller, C.A. and Vicente, K.J. 2001. “Comparison of Display Requirements Generated via 
Hierarchical Task and Abstraction-Decomposition Space Analysis 
Techniques.”International Journal of Cognitive Ergonomics 5(3):335-355. 
Morgan,L., Robertson,E., Hadi,M., Catchpole,K., Pickering,S.,New,S., Collins,G and 
McCulloch,P 2013. Capturing intraoperative process deviations using a direct 
observational approach: the glitch method. BMJ Open doi 10.1136/bmjopen-2013-003519. 
Murphy, M. F. and Kay, J. D. S. 2004. "Patient identification: problems and potential 
solutions." Vox Sanguinis 87: 197-202. 
NHS Confederation . 2016. Key statistics on the NHS. 
http://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/key-statistics-on-the-nhs (accessed on 1st June 2016) 
25 
 
NHS England. 2015a. National Safety Standards for Invasive Procedures (NatSSIPs).  
NHS England Patient Safety Domain. 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/natssips-safety-standards.pdf 
accessed on 25th April 2016 
NHS England. 2015b. Serious Incident Framework – supporting learning to prevent 
recurrence. NHS England Patient Safety Domain. https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/serious-incidnt-framwrk-upd.pdf accessed on 25th April 2016 
NHS England. 2013. Human Factors in Healthcare - A Concordat from the National Quality 
Board https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nqb-hum-fact-
concord.pdf (accessed on 1st June 2016) 
NHS Health Education England (2016). https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/explore-
roles/support-services/health-and-safety-officer (accessed on 1st November 2016)  
NHS Litigation Authority.  2014/15. NHS Litigation Authority Report and Accounts 
2014/15, Annual Review. (accessed on 30th April 2016) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/454320/NH
S_LA_Annual_Report_and_Accounts_2014-15.pdf 
Norris, B.J. 2011. “Systems Human Factors: how far have we come?” BMJ Quality and  
Safety doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2011-000476. 
Pannick, S., Sevdalis, N. and Athanasiou, T. 2015. “Beyond Clinical Engagement: a  
Pragmatic Model for Quality Improvement Interventions, aligning Clinical and managerial 
Priorities.” BMJ Quality and Safety doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2015-004453  
Peerally, M.F., S. Carr, J. Waring and M. Dixon-Woods. 2016. “The problem with root cause 
analysis”. BMJ Quality and Safety Published Online First: [23 June 2016] 
doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2016-005511 
Pickup,L, Atkinson,A, Hollnagel,E, Bowie,P, Gray,S, Rawlinson,S, Forrester,K 2017. Blood 
Sampling – Two sides to the story. Applied Ergonomics, 59: 234-242.  In press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2016.08.027. 
Rasmussen,J 1985. The Role of Hierarchical Knowledge Representation in Decision making 
and System Management. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 15,2: 
26 
 
234-243. 
Reiling, J and Chernos, S. 2007. “Human factors in hospital safety design.” In Handbook of  
Human Factors and Ergonomics in Health Care and Patient Safety, edited by Carayon, P., 
2007, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London. 
Royal College of General Practitioners Curriculum (2010). Revised 14th Aug 2013. 
http://www.rcgp.org.uk/gp-training-and-exams/gp-curriculum-overview.aspx.  
Shekelle, P.G., R.M. Wachter, P.J. Pronovost, K. Schoelles, K.M McDonald, S.M. Dy, K. 
Shojania et al. 2013. “Making Health Care Safer II: An Updated Critical Analysis of the 
Evidence for Patient Safety Practices. Comparative Effectiveness Review No. 211”. 
AHRQ Pub. No. 13- E001-EF. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality. 
www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/evidence-based-reports/ptsafetyuptp.html . 
Singh,R., Hickner,J., Mold,J and Singh,G. 2014. “Chance favours the prepared mind”: 
Preparing minds to systematically reduce hazards in the testing process in primary care. 
Journal of patient safety, 10,1:20-28. 
Straker, L .1989. “Developing an Ergonomics Position in the National Health Service” In  
Contemporary Ergonomics edited by Megaw, E., D. Taylor and Francis, London. pp355- 
360. 
Taylor-Adams, S., Vincent, C. and Street, P. 2004. “Systems analysis of clinical incidents: 
the London protocol.” Clinical Risk 10: 211–220. 
Vicente, K. J. 1999. Cognitive Work Analysis.New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Waterson, P., and Catchpole, K. 2015. "Human factors in healthcare: welcome progress, but 
still scratching the surface." BMJ Quality and Safety doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2015-005074. 
Wears, R and Hunte, G 2014. Seeing patient safety ‘Like a State’. Safety Science, 67: 50-57 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.02.007 . 
Wilson, J. R. 2014. “Fundamentals of systems ergonomics/human factors.” Applied 
Ergonomics, 45:5-13. 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
